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Forces for Change in the Regional

Performing Arts of Indonesia
In this article11 discuss a number of forces -tourism, television, the cassette industry, and, above all, the cultural policies of the Indonesian government -that have in recent decades sought to reshape the arts of Indonesia to their own ends. My focus is primarily on the regional performing arts,2 and my stance is critical, since I believe that many of the changes promoted by these forces are ones that will, if they actually occur, severely impoverish Indonesian artistic and spiritual life. I should say at the outset that I am not trying to present a theoretical analysis of the workings of these forces, but rather to assess the actual extent and effects of such change. Since 1990,1 have been engaged in recording regional music in widely scattered parts of Indonesia, as part of a project of the Smithsonian Institution and the
Masyarakat
Seni Pertunjukan Indonesia. My comments are thus those of someone directly involved in trying to identify and strengthen vital arts throughout Indonesia, and they are addressed primarily to others con cerned with the future of those arts.
Government policy: the constitutional basis
In May 1945, when it was clear that Japan would soon lose control of the former Dutch East Indies, a group of some seventy men and women began meeting in Jakarta to discuss the conceptual and institutional framework of an independent Indonesia. The group called itself the Exploratory Commit tee on Efforts to Prepare for the Independence of Indonesia (Badan Pen BKI 151-IV (1995) yelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or BPUPKI).
Eventually the group split into three smaller committees: one to consider problems of defence, one to consider economics and finance, and one to draft a constitution for the nation-to-be. digenous), and regional (Javanese, Sundanese, etc.) versus national (Indo nesian).3 On 13 July 1945, a month before independence was finally proclaimed, the constitution committee considered a draft that took a clear position on one of these central questions:
The government must advance the national culture of Indonesia, and to that end [it must] advance the culture of each region, as pillars of that national culture '.4 But the committee appears to have backed away from this position almost immediately, striking out two-thirds of the statement.5 What was left eventually (after a change only in the force of the verb) became the text of the 1945 Constitution's clause 32:
The government shall advance [lit.
: advances] the national culture of Indonesia'.6 3 Several published exchanges on these topics are collected in Mihardja 1977. What that culture will be is up to the people. ' (Bahar et al. 1992:224.) What the committee had gained in concision it had lost in clarity. In the earlier formulation, national culture is founded on or sustained by regional culture. In the second (and final) version, with regional culture cut out, the connection between regional and national is unspecified. Soepomo's explanation seems to waffle: regional cultures are Indonesian culture, but then again they aren't. Presumably what he meant is that regional culture is necessarily linked to specific regions, whereas the new nation needs a national culture, one that can be considered equally the property of any citizen. But does it need national culture instead of or as well as regional culture? And why are regional achievements not considered the heritage of all citizens of the nation?
The official Clarification (Penjelasan) of the Constitution takes a differ ent approach.7 The clarification of clause 32 reads: On the other hand, the same sentence in the Clarification can be con strued to mean that national culture consists only of what is shared by all Indonesians, in which case it must exclude anything created before the twentieth century (when the idea of a unified and independent Indonesia arose) and anything whose relevance is limited by language or content to a specific region. Surprisingly, this reading, like the first one, finds support in a statement made by Dewantara:
'Indonesian culture does not exist yet, cannot exist yet. Culture cannot be made; it has to occur, and its occurrence is not rapid or sudden: it grows, like any living thing, slowly, in stages, by evolution, not revolution.' (Dewantara 1937 (Dewantara in 1967 This second position is also the one held by Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana and echoed sixty years later by Edi Sedyawati, who in 1993 was ap pointed as the government's director-general of culture:
'The Indonesian spirit is the determination that arose in the twentieth century among our millions of people to unite and together take their proper place beside other nations. The notion of a conflict between regionalist past and nationalist present is absent here, as is Dewantara's idea of convergence. There is no need for the regional cultures to melt away: they are important elements that enrich and give variety to the national culture'.21 While a distinction is apparently still made between regional cultures and the 'entire' national culture, the nature of the distinction is vague. The national culture subsumes the regional cultures without replacing them, and policy regarding national culture thus necessarily affects regional cultures as well.
The key elements in the New Order's strategy for advancing national culture are: developing (membina)22 regional culture, promoting the use of the national language, stimulating creativity, and promoting symbols -such as those of national struggle -that can be a focus of national pride.23
Underlying and guiding all of these activities are the tenets of Pancasila. Three pitfalls are to be guarded against: feudalism, negative foreign influ ence, and narrow regionalism.24 What is not stated directly in the GBHN but is obvious from the govern ment's diction is that national culture cannot be allowed to develop on its own. Along with the ubiquitous membina, we find in the GBHNs and
Repelitas such verbs as memelihara (foster), merangsang (stimulate), and mengembangkan (develop, cultivate) to describe the government's pro grammes relating to national culture, and memupuk (fertilize), melestarikan (preserve), menggali (uncover, discover), and menyelamatkan (safeguard) for its programmes in regional culture. Clearly, national culture and its subset, regional culture, must be supervised at every turn by the govern ment.
But why? Mary Zurbuchen has offered (1990:133-4) an analysis of why the government believes it must involve itself so deeply in culture. She identifies two main reasons. One is to ensure that regional loyalties, as symbolized in regional culture, do not threaten national unity: valuation of an atmosphere conducive to the growth and development of social responsibility and solidarity, national discipline, and cultural attitudes that can meet the challenges of development. Such attitudes are: self reliance in community, sensitivity to others, discussion to reach con sensus, orientation toward the future, hard work, honesty and nobility, thrift, accuracy, simplicity, orderliness, efficient use of time, and dedica tion. In particular, we must foster cultural attitudes that support efforts at renewal, including the development of knowledge and technology.' (GBHN 1988 in Aziz 1994 With all of this at stake, it is no wonder that the government wants to keep a tight hold on culture. And indeed, since 1973 the New Order government has undertaken a vast project of cultural engineering, with perhaps its primary focus on the arts, both sacred and secular. This project has been little concerned with the most obvious and widely disseminated artistic manifestations of national culture -the pan-Indonesian literature, theatre, film, and popular music that are written, acted, and sung in Indonesian. Although pan-Indonesian work is screened (sometimes before and sometimes after publication or public presentation) for subversive, immoral, or irreligious content, there seems to be little attempt to shape the art forms themselves or the attitudes of their creators.
Instead, the focus of government intervention has been regional culture. In particular, the Ministry of Education and Culture, known as Depdikbud, has been extremely active in the field of regional arts, all across the country, from the provincial level down to the villages: registering per formers, inventorying genres, supporting a small number of high-school or college-level conservatories and music academies, monitoring content, suggesting technical or stylistic changes in performance, selecting indivi duals and groups for financial assistance, producing festivals and com petitions, commissioning performances for visiting dignitaries and state occasions, subsidizing appearances on local television, and even arranging travel to Jakarta to perform at the national theme park, Taman Mini.28
The thrust of Depdikbud's activities is threefold: to control the political content of performances, to control their moral content, and to upgrade (the English word is used, or its Indonesian equivalent, meningkatkan) their artistic quality.
One might think that the first concern in the control of political content Depdikbud's festivals, competitions, and commissions are the crucial means by which it inculcates the aesthetic of respectability. Communities are invited or urged to participate in an event by preparing a performance, and Depdikbud makes suggestions (with the force of commands) as to how this should be done: face forward, not in a circle; wear nice new uniforms; one instrument sounds thin here, more would be better; instead of one pair of dancers, how about three pairs; these women are so old, you should get some younger ones who are nice to look at; shorten this so the audience isn't bored; this song would be better if it had a dance with it.32
Often the net effect of such changes as abbreviating performances, 'modernizing' scales and instrumentation, simplifying the repertoire, and foregrounding inexperienced younger performers is to trivialize the art form. Apparently, Depdikbud sees no conflict between promoting such changes and its responsibility to 'safeguard' or 'preserve' the traditional arts: the changes are made merely so that the arts will be, in a common phrase, sesuai dengan irama zaman, 'in step with the times'. What the times demand, evidently, is art that is neat and orderly, There was an extensive repertoire of song types and established texts, and new texts were constantly being created, often spontaneously during performance. Group wor were sung primarily at the frequently rowdy night-long feasts that were a central element in Biak social life. Such feasts are now rare, and wor itself was until recently obsolete, though many older people could still sing it when I first came to Biak in 1993 to record. By 1994, when I again came to Biak, the local government had got hold of wor and sponsored a revival. In its new, official form, the repertoire contained only a few simple songs, which were performed in a clean, unison style, with none of the heterophony of old. The revival largely ignored the older singers who could have served as key resources. Instead, Depdikbud organized wor competitions recruiting groups of children and teenagers, who obviously had no first-hand knowledge of the art. They were judged on their costumes and on a criterion utterly foreign to old style wor: precision or synchrony in song and movement.
With the exception of some of the older singers, whose expertise had been discounted, people in Biak seemed to see nothing inappropriate in this radical revision of wor. Similarly, it must be said that throughout Indonesia, performers seem quite willing to follow Depdikbud's upgrading directives. Satisfying the local Depdikbud can lead to invitations to bigger eventscompetitions or festivals at the district, provincial, or even national level -or to a lucrative spot on the tourist circuit. In hopes of these rewards, performers do not seem to mind subordinating the local aesthetic to Depdikbud's.
Nor do they seem conscious that something still more basic is also at risk: the communal dimension of regional art. The changes Depdikbud promotes nullify the aspect of meaning that depends not on the sounds, words, movements, and symbols deployed, but on who is performing, who is observing, and what the local significance of the performance is. formerly sacred spot in the village, where they see 'priests' preparing 'warriors' for battle while the gong ensemble plays to encourage them. Next the tourists are led to another spot, to see one group pretend to ambush another; then they see a full battle depicted, at the end of which a severed head made of rubber is produced from under a cloth and carried off by triumphant dancers.38
In some areas where inhabitants still hold to the old beliefs, tourism, working in tandem with the government, has taken over the administration of certain rituals, to local dissatisfaction: 36 It is important to remember that the promotion of tourism is one of the provincial committee, or to stage phony rituals turned into a show in improper circumstances (or at all) for the sake of visitors. Even in Christian villages, religious leaders make sure the old gods are not angered by the festival's improper setting. They subtly modify the proceedings, replacing a sacred item with an innocuous, profane one and skipping the phases where the gods and spirits attend, so that there is no spiritual risk for the community.' (Sellato 1995.)39
Here, although the old people still consider the rituals sacred, de facto desacralization has already taken place, and villagers profane the rituals precisely in order to protect them (or themselves). In any case, it is the government rather than the tourist industry that needs desacralization. What the tourist industry needs is the exotic but infinitely repeatable performance, and desacralization is simply a con venient means of achieving it. If it could be repeatable and stay sacred, that would be fine too. Similarly, the international tourist trade does not necessarily have the Indonesian government's scruples about gambling, drunkenness, prostitution, and other activities that are officially deplored, nor does it care about government propaganda messages. Tourism and the government work hand in glove, but their aims are not identical.
I will close this part of the discussion by mentioning two other forces for change in the regional arts. Television and the cassette industry may be lumped together as 'mass media', but as with government and tourism, distinctions should be drawn.
After many years in which television broadcasting in Indonesia was exclusively a government prerogative, a loosening of controls began in the late 1980s, and several independent television stations have sprung up since then. The independent stations may produce their own entertainment programmes or may buy them from foreign television, but they may not relay foreign news, and their own news programming is subordinated to the government's. (At the designated news times all Indonesian television stations, state or private, broadcast the identical news, produced by the government.) While in theory the independent stations could develop their own programmes on regional matters, including the arts, in fact they do not do so, preferring to broadcast material from abroad.40 So the only stations 39 Compare the account given by Rithaony Hutajulu, elsewhere in this volume, of government management of a' Toba Batak ritual. 40 I am told that recently the 'educational' channel, TPI, has begun to broadcast programmes on regional culture. But judging from TPI's performance so far, and the fact that the channel is owned by a daughter of the president, it seems highly unlikely that these programmes will take an attitude toward the regional arts that differs significantly from the government's.
active in programming concerned with the regional arts are the govern ment stations, and their needs are those of the government: profession alized, morally acceptable, propaganda-friendly performances, with or without ritual origins but in either case functionally secular.
The cassette industry, on the other hand, has a quite different set of needs. As everywhere else in the world, commercial recording in Indonesia tries to establish a framework of marketing categories -repertoire, per former, and genre or idiom of performance are the main ones -and then cycle items of raw material (an individual piece, a performer, or a kind of music) through the structure. A given song will be introduced by one singer and then imitated or reinterpreted by others; a given singer will produce a number of albums within one genre and then branch out to another genre; a successful song or composition will be translated into new genres or idioms.41 This system has a constant need for new material but needs also to fit that material into the framework. Accordingly, unless regional music can accommodate a system of star performers (whether individuals or ensembles) and can produce a stream of new repertoire, its appeal to the cassette industry is fatally limited. Thus the operating logic of the industry pressures regional music to change in fundamental ways. Professionalism in performance is encour aged, for if everyone in a community has equal command of the music, why would anyone buy a recording? Proliferation of new repertoire is also encouraged -partly to provide new products for purchase, but also to make the repertoire so extensive that amateurs can no longer master it.
Furthermore, the industry pushes interchange between regional musicsor, more commonly, between regional music and national or international musics -as a means of introducing not only new repertoire but also new idioms of performance. (This is, I believe, the structural reason why so many cassettes feature regional melodies arranged for European pop instru mentation.) In the United States, television and recording are both branches of the entertainment industry, and both operate, for the most part, according to the commercial logic I have just described. In Indonesia, however, television -that is, the government-run television that presents regional arts -is a propaganda medium, and it follows official policy, not commercial logic. Unlike television, the cassette industry is under no obligation (and no particularly strong inducement) to incorporate propaganda messages or to promote religious orthodoxy and the desacralization of unorthodox ritual, nor does it have any internal commitment to respectability.
Still, since the cassette industry is subject to censorship by the 1987, 1989) .
government, depends for operating permissions upon the government, and aspires to reach not only the low-income rural market but also the higher income urban middle-and upper-class markets that share many of the government's values, the aesthetic and logic of cassette recordings are (as with tourism and television) often congruent with those of the govern ment. The interests of the government and the industry would diverge only if a market should emerge for a music expressing rebelliousness of some sort (sexual, political, religious) that the government found unacceptable.
In such cases, the industry would wish to develop the market, and the government to suppress it. In present-day Indonesia, the government would undoubtedly win.
The effects: an interim report These, then, are the principal political and economic forces pressing the regional arts to change. It is important to recognize that although they work together, they do not constitute a single, unified force. Resistance to the changes they promote requires recognition of the particularities of their aims and tendencies.
Is there any possibility of successful resistance? My only objection to the articles by Acciaioli and Foulcher is that they lead to the conclusion that there is nothing to be done. If the government's cultural policy is really just one element in a deliberate strategy to legitimize exploitation of the regions (Foulcher), or to 'domesticate' the people through 'enforced homogenization' (Acciaioli) , what can lone voices hope to achieve? The government will hardly give up its plans for the forests of Riau or Kali mantan or Irian Jaya simply because a small group bemoans the loss of this flute or that song-form, or even the demise of forest societies that the government regards as 'isolated' and 'uncivilized'. But this is why I raised the question of effects versus intentions: if the negative effects of change are consciously intended by the government, then there is indeed little to be done, but if they are instead (as I believe) unintended or secondary effects, the byproducts of the desire to control and to 'upgrade', then efforts can be made to mitigate the effects and modify the desires.
It would be a terrible waste to give up on the regional arts at this point.
It is true that the various forces for change have in many parts of Indonesia succeeded in producing or eliciting the controlled, respectable, desacral ized, professionalized arts they want; but it is by no means clear that these disinfected and upgraded forms always replace the original village forms.
Gandrung dancers and musicians in Banyuwangi have learned how to boil down their nightlong performance into a half-hour sketch for a festival or a visiting dignitary, but this will hardly do for a wedding or circumcision celebration in the village. The people in central Flores who perform the headhunting playlet for tourists have a recreational dance (tari hegong) that they do for themselves, with no sham battles or rubber heads. Barbara Hatley (1990) reports that a sanitized rey o g is now being performed in Ponorogo, with female dancers instead of the pretty young men of the traditional form -but only for official visits. For public occasions in Biak, the government sponsors performances of the dance called yospan, featuring dancers in neat rows executing complicated steps in unison; but yospan is also the indispensable entertainment at village parties, where those tidy rows become a boisterous stream of dancers in happy disarray (Rutherford 1995) . Or consider one of the great successes of the drive for respectability, the Sundanese jaipongan dance, which was created expressly to provide an alternative to disreputable dance genres too closely allied with prostitution and vulgar sexuality: jaipongan became so popular that a reclaimed, revulgarized version appeared among the urban poor.
I am suggesting that much of what the forces for change have produced so far is an official art, parallel to but divorced from the true artistic life of Indonesians. In the recording work that I have been doing since 1990, I have found performers and traditions all over Indonesia that are still vital and still important to their communities; often upgrading has taken place, but its effects are felt only in official contexts.42
Even in the societies whose people adhere to 'minority religions', the pressure from government, tourism, and organized religion to abandon traditional belief and the ritual arts that spring from it has in many cases not led to the eradication of either the arts or the beliefs. Looking just at the present moment, I believe the regional arts of Indonesia are in much better shape than is generally admitted. By which I mean: it is still possible in many Indonesian societies, in the right place in the right season, to witness performances of arts that were developed in or appropriated by those societies, not externally imposed, and are intended for the pleasure, instruction, protection, or other purposes of the people of those societies, not for the entertainment or other purposes of outsiders. It is true that many of the genres reported in ethnographies from the colonial era have vanished, but many also remain; even some new ones have emerged. Most of the genres that exist today still serve their communities rather than (or, if they have been upgraded, as well as) external powers.
Although a shift is discernible from 'folk', community-based arts to 'popular' ones based in urban centres and disseminated to the regions, one also sees popular genres reclaimed by rural communities.
At the same time, many forces are busily chipping away at this foundation: the government's programmes to make the arts respectable; its efforts to turn them into instruments for national development; tourism's desire to make them attractive to transient visitors; the cassette industry's need to convert them into product; the patronizing and belittling attitudes of government and media towards rural society and its pursuits.
But these forces are not without opposition. Neither the government as a whole nor Depdikbud is a monolithic entity, and there are officials, at high and low levels, who reject the idea of upgrading and oppose the view that the primary function of the arts is to serve the government; there are also those who, on no broader principle than solidarity or nostalgia, work to maintain the arts of their own society. And there is room for them to manoeuvre. As I have tried to show, government policy for the arts is founded on an ambiguous and self-contradictory constitutional formula tion; it has been elaborated in the New Order with the hope that the arts can, in unspecified ways, be engineered to construct the New Indonesian; and in practice it serves mainly to enforce a vague standard of respect ability. In conditions of such confusion and imprecision, there is great leeway in how individuals and local offices interpret and implement government policy. Indonesians have started to discuss publicly the negative effects of policy and tourism on the regional arts. The article by Koentjaraningrat (1992) and the speech by Sedyawati (1994), both mentioned earlier, are noteworthy in that they question the basic assumption, expressed in the Constitution and elaborated by Dewantara, that the government should be in the business of accepting and rejecting art forms. Complaints about the violence done to the arts by tourist promoters are heard in newspapers (for example, Haska 1992). A number of well-respected commentators have published articles criticizing arts development and recommending, in essence, that the improvers leave the arts alone (Kayam 1993; Murgiyanto, 1993; Suanda 1985 Suanda , 1993 .
Hope for the mitigation and moderation of policy rests, I believe, in these two counterforces, government officials unwilling to give the arts over wholly to the uses of government and tourism, and public debate on the intent and consequences of government practice. It can be argued that these are weak reeds, unable to withstand the juggernaut of allied forces seeking to appropriate the regional arts. I would reply that even so, the future significance and value of the regional arts are not yet determined.
In the first place, as I have shown, appropriation can take place on an official plane and still not touch the arts where they live. Secondly, even if the regional arts should all be co-opted -thoroughly, not just officially -and converted into vehicles for Their Master's Voice, there would always remain the possibility of subversion or renovation -illicit lyrics, disap proved repertoire, strategic wrong notes, startling tempos, incongruous instruments. And thirdly, most fundamentally: even if co-opted, the regional arts, to the extent that they employ techniques, idioms, and materials not found in the arts of the dominant culture, remain inherently oppositional. Not in a directly political sense, but conceptually: they declare that there are alternative ways to organize perception and ex perience. No matter how much the presentation and interpretation of, say, Central Javanese gamelan music have been altered to fit official purposes, its elements -the intervals in its scales, the structures of its compositions -are stubbornly independent.
I am not saying that there is no way to empty the regional arts of their inherent oppositionality. This can be achieved by altering the basic structural materials of the art to bring them into conformity with the dominant style. (Turn the teeming heterophony of wor into clean, precise unison, and wor ceases to offer an alternative to the standard model of musical behaviour.) However, for the government, this radical surgery has the negative effect of homogenizing the arts, reducing the artistic diversity that the government nominally seeks to maintain. For tourism also, the effect is undesirable, since that same diversity draws tourists. The recording industry, on the other hand, does benefit from this homogenization, which breaks down barriers to the circulation of the dominant style.
Neither am I saying that since the arts can bounce back and are oppositional anyway, no harm is done by upgrading or otherwise tailoring them to external needs. Much of their specific power and meaning, their character and complexity, may be diminished in the process of upgrading or other redesign.
What I am saying is that from the government's point of view little is gained and much may be lost by trying to change the arts. Ultimately, even successful co-optation of the arts is futile, since the real target is never the arts themselves, but rather the dissatisfaction or nonconformity they express -and these do not disappear simply because they are denied expression. Moreover, they can usually find other means of expression: any medium, from music to clothing to colour to silence, can become oppositional, no matter how bland or tame it was before.44 Would it not be more efficient, then, for the government to address directly the difficulties of equitably integrating disparate cultures, instead of seeking merely to control the symbolic expressions of cultural identity? Though they may be brought under control temporarily, those symbols remain constantly available for reinterpretation and reclamation.
If the final consequence of the changes promoted by the various forces is to weaken the importance of the regional arts to regional audiences, this will produce no significant benefit for either the government or tourism.
Only the recording industry will benefit: instead of having to serve a multitude of incompatible local tastes, it can market Jakarta pop (along with imported varieties) throughout the country. Surely this is not the Indonesian national culture that Alisjahbana or Dewantara or the framers of the Constitution had in mind.
44 In this regard, see the overview of 'musics of struggle' by Seeger (1990) and the associated brief essays by Jacquelin C. Peters and Amy Horowitz.
